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Conflicting Preferences and
Advance Directives
Sandra Woien, Arizona State University
Hertogh and his colleagues argue that “the condition of
advanced dementia can never be a reason to perform eu-
thanasia based on an [advance euthanasia directive] AED”
(Hertogh et al. 2007, 48). The main reason given for this
conclusion is based on the issue of conflicting preferences
or desires. As they discuss, people often compose AEDs in
case they later suffer from dementia and cannot make fully
autonomous decisions. Following tradition, we will refer to
such preferences as now-for-then preferences. However, once
people suffer from dementia, the authors mention that their
desires may change as they adapt to the new situation (Her-
togh et al. 2007). If this is accurate, we can then maintain that
such people also have a now-for-now preference or current de-
sire to continue to live. Because of this situation, we have
conflicting preferences that identify mutually inconsistent
states of affairs as contributing to their welfare. The authors
seem to assume that either current preferences are always
stronger than now-for-then preferences or, when there is a
case of conflicting preferences, that there is no way to deter-
mine which preference is stronger. So we may ask are these
assumptions correct? To answer this question, it is instruc-
tive to appeal to the literature regarding desire satisfaction
theories of welfare. Desire satisfaction theories purport to
show that a person’s life goes well for her if most of her
strongly held and typically informed preferences or desires
are satisfied.
According to an unrestricted version of desire satisfac-
tion theories, preference strength is simply a function of felt
intensity. If we appeal to such a theory, there is no good rea-
son to suppose the now-for-then desire is stronger than the
current desire, and it is even possible that the current de-
sire is even stronger. Unrestricted desire theories, however,
face many problems including the scope problem; there-
fore, most theorists reject the unrestricted theory in favor
of a restricted version such as the informed desire theory
(Brandt 1998; Griffin 1986; Hare 1981; Harsanyi 1977). Once
this change is made, the strength of a desire is not a function
of only its felt intensity, whether the desire is informed also
plays a role in determining its strength and thereby its place
in preference ordering. The stipulation of the term informed
places certain epistemological requirements on our desires,
and so desires based on misinformation, lack of relevant in-
formation, oppressive social conditioning, and other kind
of errors may not contribute as much to our welfare as con-
trary desires based on full information. This stipulation also
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implies that we have the capacity to think rationally and to
weigh certain options.
With this restriction in place, we can query, in the case
before us, whether their now-for-then desire to die if they
develop Alzheimer’s disease is more informed than their
present desire to live. Once dementia sets in, people’s ability
to make autonomous choices is impaired. Although, as the
authors mention, such persons can still express somewhat
trivial preferences, it is doubtful that their current prefer-
ences are as informed as their now-for-then preferences. Do
they fully understand what the future holds for them? Do
they realize that they can no longer identify and often com-
municate with their children? Do they even remember that
they once firmly believed that they would not want to live
under such conditions? Furthermore, as Dworkin (1994) has
cogently argued, it is doubtful that their current preferences
are consistent with their critical interests such as their life
plans and their deep values that they were still mindful of
when filling out such a form. And critical interests can give
rise to global desires that also impact welfare such as I want
to live my life autonomously in accordance with my deepest
values and first-order desires, such as I want to want assis-
tance dying when I have lost a coherent sense of self. The
authors also mention that when people complete this type
of advanced directive, they are told that their desires may
change when they become demented. As Hertogh and his
coauthors write, “the subscriber explicitly declares . . . that
regardless of what he wishes or states after having become
demented, only the patient’s earlier opinions as expressed
in the advance directive are to be respected” (2007, 48). Since
such now-for-then desires are more informed than their cur-
rent desires, are more in accordance with their critical inter-
ests they were mindful of when completing such a form,
and are related to certain global desires about how they
want to live, it is plausible to argue that their now-for-then
desire to die is stronger than their current desire to
live.
Another possible assumption is that there is no way to
deal with conflicting desires, and so now-for-then desires
must be thrown out of the preference ordering. This thought
has had some hold on the theoretical literature (Brandt
1998; Hare 1981). However, a contemporary philosopher
has come up with a plausible solution to this problem.
Arneson (1990) suggests that we simply include all pref-
erences past, present, and future, and when we do the
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Euthanasia for Patients With Dementia
preference ordering, the preferences are weighed accord-
ingly. If some preferences happen to conflict, this is no prob-
lem as the one that is the strongest, in terms of its hypotheti-
cal rationality, is the one we should satisfy. Even though we
have a now-for-then desire and a present desire that identify
inconsistent states of affairs as contributing to welfare, we
can simply disregard the desire that is lower in the prefer-
ence ordering. In this case, it again appears that the present
desire would be weaker since it is not as informed as the
now-for-then desire.
As I have demonstrated, current preferences are not al-
ways stronger than past preferences, and it is possible to
deal with conflicting preferences. Because of this, the au-
thors’ conclusion does not necessarily follow from the main
reason given. They have provided no strong theoretical rea-
son for denying such people the option of euthanasia if their
now-for-then desire to have their lives terminated was fully
informed and in accordance with their precedent autonomy.
Furthermore, if welfare is understood as preference satis-
faction, then thwarting their now-for-then preferences may
cause their lives to worsen, and it is certainly possible to use
this theory of welfare to derive an account of best interests. If
this is done, then both the best interest standard and prece-
dent autonomy standard may point in the same direction.
As in the case of Ulysses, who told his crew to disregard
his pleas to be released on hearing the enticing cries of the
sirens, both precedent autonomy and welfare beckon us to
disregard their present desires, and since their now-for-then
desire, as explicitly stated in their AED, is more informed
than their present desire to live, we have a strong reason to
honor it. 
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An Islamic Perspective on Euthanasia
Kiarash Aramesh, Tehran University of Medical Sciences
Heydar Shadi, Tehran University of Medical Sciences
And take not life, which Allah has made sacred, except by way of
justice and law.
— Holy Koran, Al-An’am, Verse 151
In Iran, in contrast to European countries such as the
Netherlands (Hertogh et al. 2007), the laws and regula-
tions regarding such subjects as euthanasia are based on
Islamic (Shiite) jurisprudence. This jurisprudence has four
main sources. The first and most important one is the
Holy Koran, the primary source of Islamic law. The sec-
ond source of Islamic law is Sunnah, which is what the
prophet (and Imams in the Shiite school) said, did, or
agreed to. The third source is Ijma, which is consensus
of Islamic scholars, and the fourth one is Aghl, which is
the reason.
Based on a convincing interpretation of the Koran, Is-
lamic jurisprudence does not recognize a person’s right
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to die voluntarily. According to Islamic teachings, life is
a divine trust and cannot be terminated by any form of
active or passive voluntary intervention (Sachedina 2005).
All Islamic scholars regard active euthanasia as forbid-
den or hiram, and the Sunni (Al-Qaradawi 2005) and Shi-
ite (Khamenei 2007) scholars are in agreement on this
matter.
There are two instances, however, that could be inter-
preted as passive assistance in allowing a terminally ill pa-
tient to die and thus would be permissible under Islamic
law: 1) administering analgesic agents that might shorten
the patient’s life with the purpose of relieving the physical
pain or mental distress, and 2) withdrawing a futile treat-
ment with the informed consent of the immediate family
members who act on the professional advice of the physi-
cians in charge of the case, and allowing death to take its
natural course (Sachedina 2005).
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